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ON THE VERY IDEA OF A RECOVERY MODEL FOR MENTAL 
HEALTH 
Introduction 
Both in the UK and internationally, the ‘recovery model’ has been promoted to guide mental 
healthcare in reaction against what is perceived to be an overly narrow traditional bio-medical 
model. It has also begun to have an influence in thinking more broadly about mental health 
both for individuals and for communities and in the latter case has been linked to policies to 
promote social inclusion. In this widening application, however, there is a risk that the model 
becomes too broad to count as a model and thus to compete with other models such as a bio-
medical model of health or illness. 
In this short paper we sketch some of the competing views of illness and health in order to 
locate and articulate a possible recovery model for mental health. We suggest that a distinct 
recovery model could be based on a view that places values at the centre of an analysis of 
mental health. Our aim, however, is to clarify the options rather than defend the model that 
emerges. 
We do, however, caution against one possible version of a recovery model. Thus if a recovery 
model were to be defended along the line we sketch we think that it would be better to 
construe the values involved on eudaimonic rather than hedonic lines. 
Background 
Although much recent thinking about the aims of mental healthcare stresses the role of 
recovery, there is little agreement about what, precisely, that means. Before going on to make 
their own suggestions, Larry Davidson and David Roe, for example, summarise the situation 
internationally thus: ‘There is an increasing global commitment to recovery as the expectation 
for people with mental illness. There remains, however, little consensus on what recovery 
means in relation to mental illness’ [1]. In the UK, a recent policy paper published by the 
Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health called ‘Making recovery a reality’ begins by 
summarising some key points of emphasis which, it is suggested, characterise any broadly 
recovery-based approach. These points include: 
Recovery is about building a meaningful and satisfying life, as defined by the person 
themselves, whether or not there are ongoing or recurring symptoms or problems. 
Recovery represents a movement away from pathology, illness and symptoms to 
health, strengths and wellness. 
Hope is central to recovery and can be enhanced by each person seeing how they can 
have more active control over their lives (‘agency’) and by seeing how others have 
found a way forward. 
Self-management is encouraged and facilitated. The processes of self-management 
are similar, but what works may be very different for each individual. No ‘one size 
fits all’. 
The helping relationship between clinicians and patients moves away from being 
expert / patient to being ‘coaches’ or ‘partners’ on a journey of discovery. Clinicians 
are there to be “on tap, not on top”. 
People do not recover in isolation. Recovery is closely associated with social 
inclusion and being able to take on meaningful and satisfying social roles within local 
communities, rather than in segregated services. 
Recovery is about discovering – or re-discovering – a sense of personal identity, 
separate from illness or disability. [2] 
As this list suggests, recovery is not so much a precisely articulated explicit theoretical 
account of the nature of health or illness as a practical orientation to the kind of care that 
should be provided and the roles of patients or service users and clinicians or carers. 
Nevertheless, advocates of recovery in mental health often talk of a recovery model, with the 
implication that it stands in opposition to a bio-medical model of health or illness [3]. We will 
attempt to use the list above and a sketch of some of the debates about health and illness to 
suggest a possible recovery model. (A defence of the model would thus require a defence of 
choices made or positions adopted in those debates which we will not attempt here.)  
To articulate a recovery model, in contrast, for example, to a bio-medical model, is not simply 
to say that recovery (construed in some broad way) is a desirable aim of mental health care. 
One might hold a narrow bio-medical model based view of health or illness (of what health or 
illness is) whilst still thinking that the broader aims of mental health care can be characterised 
in the terms promoted by the recovery movement. But that would not be a recovery model and 
would not stand opposed to a bio-medical model (for example). 
An important clue to the articulation of a model is the idea that recovery should be 
characterised through a positive goal of health and wellness rather than the avoidance of the 
negative aspects of pathology and illness. That positive goal is connected to the agency of the 
individual, to their own situation-specific self management of the process, and to their 
identity. To serve as the characteristics of a model, however, requires the additional idea that 
these play a role in a correct understanding of health or illness themselves. We will suggest 
that the presence of a normative dimension or of values in debates about health and illness 
provides a route to a recovery model. 
The above list also connects recovery to social inclusion through the empirical claim that 
social inclusion promotes recovery. But given the links between policies promoting recovery 
at the individual level and policies promoting social inclusion at the level of communities this 
raises a further question that helps shed light on the connections between recovery and values: 
need recovery promote social inclusion? By stressing individual choice as the final arbiter of 
the values that form the goal of recovery, the model suggests a view of society as a group of 
individuals satisfying their private desires. That seems to threaten, rather than support, the 
notion of social inclusion and the idea of collective values or goods. 
But further, if the satisfaction of just any desire can be part of the conception of recovery then 
the model may cease to have a connection to the idea of health. It would be not so much a 
corrective of the bio-medical model as a totally different venture. 
We will attempt to sketch a conception of a recovery model which is distinct from a bio-
medical approach but which is still sufficiently normatively charged that there is some hope, 
at least, that it can avoid both of these risks. We will not, however, attempt to defend it 
against rival approaches to recovery. Our aim is to locate and characterise rather than justify a 
model of recovery. 
The normativity of illness / disease / disorder 
In the next section, we will argue that a recovery model for mental health care can be based 
on a view that mental health can only be characterised in evaluative terms. But to help to 
characterise that view it will be helpful to begin by setting out a more familiar contrast: that 
between an evaluative or normative versus a plainly factual view of mental illness. And to do 
that, we will offer a short historical context. 
In his attack on the very idea of mental illness, Thomas Szasz stressed that the concept of 
illness, whether physical or mental, carries with it the connotation of deviation from a 
normative standard, a standard that carries a distinction between correctness and 
incorrectness. (In what follows ‘normative’ will be used to refer to any such standard; the key 
contrast is with the merely statistically normal.) 
The concept of illness, whether bodily or mental, implies deviation from some clearly 
defined norm. In the case of physical illness, the norm is the structural and functional 
integrity of the human body. Thus, although the desirability of physical health, as 
such, is an ethical value, what health is can be stated in anatomical and physiological 
terms. What is the norm, deviation from which is regarded as mental illness? This 
question cannot be easily answered. But whatever this norm may be, we can be 
certain of only one thing: namely, that it must be stated in terms of psychological, 
ethical, and legal concepts… [4] 
Szasz used this point as the basis for an argument against mental illness. Nothing can both 
satisfy this condition and the condition of being medically treatable. Thus one possible route 
to defend that concept would be to disagree that illness need carry a normative connotation. 
(A distinct defence is to accept the condition but argue that it does not support the conclusions 
Szasz draws [5].) Perhaps illness could be defined in merely statistical terms. But as even as 
biologically minded a psychiatrist as Robert Kendell realised, such an approach cannot work. 
Reviewing the history of the debate he commented: 
By 1960 the ‘lesion’ concept of disease, and its associated assumptions of a single 
cause and a qualitative difference between sickness and health had been discredited 
beyond redemption, but nothing had yet been put in its place. It was clear, though, 
that its successor would have to be based on a statistical model. [6] 
But, as Kendell went on to say, whilst a statistical model may address some of the weaknesses 
of a single lesion model, statistical abnormality by itself cannot distinguish between 
‘deviations from the norm which are harmful, like hypertension, those which are neutral, like 
great height, and those which are positively beneficial, like superior intelligence’ [6]. Some 
further criterion is needed to address the fact that illness is a specific kind of deviation from 
the norm and Kendell followed the work of the British chest physician, JG Scadding in 
suggesting that biological disadvantage (including increased mortality and reduced fertility 
‘whether it should embrace other impairments as well is less obvious’ [6]) is the key idea. 
More recently there has been an attempt to explain this normative dimension more precisely 
using the idea of biological or proper function of sub-personal traits (not just advantage or 
disadvantage to whole individuals). The hope is that whilst illness or disease may carry the 
irreducible notion of harm, a core notion of disorder can be fitted within a purely descriptive 
scientific account, drawing on evolutionary theory [7]. The prima facie normative dimension 
of disorder can be explained through the apparently normative notion of biological function. 
But functions can be analysed through the plainly descriptive or factual notion of what best 
explains their continued presence within evolved organisms. 
A natural function of a biological mechanism is an effect of the mechanism that 
explains the existence, maintenance or nature of the mechanism via the same essential 
process (whatever it is) by which prototypical nonaccidental beneficial effects... 
explain the mechanism which cause them...  
It turns out that the process that explains the prototypical non-accidental benefits is 
natural selection acting to increase inclusive fitness of the organism. [7]  
The aim is thus to capture the prima facie normativity of disorder within a plainly factual 
scientific account. This non-normative or ‘values-out’ view is thus one important position in 
the debate about illness. Disorder, which lies at the heart of illness, can at least be accounted 
without any irreducible invocation of values. 
There are, however, two challenges to this approach. First there is an objection raised 
originally elsewhere in philosophy that norms are smuggled back into the particular choice of 
evolutionary explanation [8, 9, 10]. In other words, explanation in terms of biological 
function is not plainly descriptive. More specifically, for psychiatric disorder, it is unclear that 
the necessary distinction between natural and merely social functions can be maintained [11].  
If one thinks that either of these objections is successful then – in the absence of any other 
approaches – it seems that to identify some of the behaviour of either a whole person or a sub-
personal biological system as expressive of illness is to conceptualise it in irreducibly 
normative terms. To put this another way, different behavioural dispositions have to be 
filtered through some sort of normative sieve to yield only those that are expressive of illness 
or disease. This is a broadly normative or ‘values-in’ position. 
The normativity, or not, of recovery 
Just as a central aspect of the debate about illness can be characterised as normative or 
‘values-in’ versus non-normative or ‘values-out’, the same distinction can be applied to 
theorising about health. We suggest that a recovery model might plausibly be based on a 
‘values-in’ model of health. 
Note, however, that even if one assumes that the concept of illness is essentially normative 
(statistically unusual behaviour is not sufficient for illness, for example), recovery may not be 
so. On the ‘values-in’ picture sketched above, one identifies tracts of behaviour (of people, or 
of their biological systems) as expressive of illness by filtering all forms of behaviour through 
an appropriate normative sieve. The filter may use distinct normative terms such as Fulford’s 
failure of ordinary doing or be a primitive and irreducible illness notion such as sufficiently 
resembling paradigmatic illnesses [12]. Once it has been applied, what remain are 
normatively selected states or behaviours.  
Recovery itself might plausibly be thought of as the return from such states to a state of 
health. Health itself, however, might be conceptualised in merely statistically normal (rather 
than normative) terms. If so, whilst the states that individuals have an interest in recovering 
from are those with particular normative or evaluative properties (whatever precisely those 
are), recovery itself might be characterised in non-normative non-evaluative terms. 
(One might assume that the two debates cannot be independent in the way just suggested. If 
one adopts a descriptive or values-out view of health, then since illness is, surely, a significant 
lack of health, illness can inherit a values-out status. In fact, however, this move goes just too 
quickly. Not all deviations from a statistically normal conception of health would amount to 
illnesses whilst it is far from clear that attempting to target only illness through talk of a lack 
of health would remain value-free. Given that our aim is modestly to articulate the space of 
possibilities we will not presuppose any such link.)  
For physical health, a descriptive approach is at least a possible picture although some initial 
qualifications would be necessary for it to be plausible. Age, for example, makes a difference. 
What is a healthy physical state for an 80 year old will not be for an 18 year old. (This is not 
to downplay the burden of aging but to distinguish such burden from pathology or illness.) 
Further, it may even be statistically normal for most members of particular groups of people 
(small children, the elderly) to have some illness or other in some or other biological system. 
If so, and if health were to be defined in normal terms, normality would have to be defined for 
each such sub-system rather than for the whole person. But given suitable qualification, there 
is one plausible feature of such an approach: it avoids any idealisation of health. One can be 
healthy – that is: not ill – without being at the peak of physical condition. The fact that one 
would prefer to be fitter, stronger or more muscled does not imply that one is not healthy as 
one is. 
An analysis of physical health in statistically normal (rather than normative) terms also helps 
rationalise a bio-medical approach to recovery. Once the starting point has been identified, a 
state picked out as an illness, no further mention need be made of normative notions, for 
example values. Recovery, so construed, would be merely an engineering problem for the 
human body. 
If a non-normative model of physical health helps to rationalise a bio-medical approach, can a 
contrasting model be articulated for a normative or evaluative model of health? We suggest 
that one can be based on the following line of thought (although assessing whether or not this 
line of thought is finally satisfactory is not our concern here). Although it is plausible to 
define physical health in statistical terms, in the case of mental health, however, the end point 
might have to be essentially normatively, or more precisely, evaluatively characterised. 
According to this line of thought, mental health cannot be construed as a statistically average 
kind of life but rather, in line with the quotation from the Sainsbury Centre policy document, 
a particular kind of life valued and hoped for by the individual concerned, the kind of life 
connected to their identity. 
If this were the case, there would be no hope of defining the endpoint of recovery for mental 
health in non-normative or non-evaluative terms. A specific endpoint would be correct for, or 
suited to, each individual. And thus recovery would properly be aimed at a specific and 
normatively characterised or valued endpoint. This looks to be a way to think of a 
characteristic recovery model (rather than just a particular approach to recovery) because it 
turns on a theoretical view of the nature of health towards which recovery aims. It merits the 
name ‘model’. 
Is this the only way of approaching the nature of mental health? Is a recovery model the only 
plausible approach to mental health? We do not think so. To defend, rather than merely 
rationalise, a recovery model for mental health so construed would require dismissing a 
variant of the statistically normal approach. Whilst characterising a statistically normal kind 
of life seems misguided, the capacities that enable one to live such a life may be more 
appropriate for that treatment. So, in the service of a valued and hoped for life, mental health 
might be defined in terms of statistically normal mental capacities and abilities. Our aim here, 
however, is not to argue for a recovery model but to explore its place in the range of options. 
To summarise this section, contrasting approaches to health help to justify two contrasting 
approaches to recovery: 
Recovery1: a return to normality (albeit from a position picked out by a normative sieve). 
Recovery2: a move (from a position picked out by a normative sieve) to a normatively 
characterised endpoint, for example, a conception of a valued form of life. 
Recovery2 suggests that whether someone has recovered or not depends not on the plainly 
descriptive matter of whether they have returned to a statistically normal state but rather on 
reaching a normatively or evaluatively characterised state that constitutes wellbeing. We 
suggest that this could form the basis of a recovery model of mental health, a model which 
would stand in genuine contrast to a bio-medical model based instead on recovery1. 
Although we have merely sketched the conceptual space for a recovery model rather than 
arguing for it we will end by drawing attention to two potential objections. By briefly 
considering these, we can offer one final potentially helpful distinction and indicate 
something of the work that would remain for justifying a recovery model. 
The right values for recovery? 
The key assumption in our rationalisation of a recovery model for mental health is that the 
endpoint of recovery has to be characterised in normative or evaluative terms. On this view, 
there is something appropriate or correct rather than merely usual about the endpoint. But, 
perhaps because of the rise of autonomy as the key medical ethical value, there is a standing 
temptation to construe this normative dimension in a particular way. That is, in accord with 
the desires and choices of the individual concerned. (And put like that, it is tempting to 
wonder who else’s desires and choices should be preferred.) Nevertheless, if the norms in 
play primarily reflect individual desires and choices then this threatens to open up a gap 
between recovery and health and also puts the idea of social inclusion at the level of 
communities under pressure. 
We do not wish to underplay the difficulties here. Any recovery model based on our 
suggestion would have to identify why the normatively or evaluatively charged endpoint was 
constitutive of mental health rather than some other valued aim or end (of which health might 
be merely an aspect). Establishing that mental health is an essentially evaluative notion is not 
sufficient for saying which values are specifically relevant for mental health and thus which 
values are excluded from that analysis. Nevertheless, we suspect that there are more and less 
promising approaches based on contrasting views of wellbeing. 
Consider two contrasting views of wellbeing: hedonic and eudaimonic. On the hedonic view: 
wellbeing is essentially a matter of maximising utility; and, on the assumption that what 
people actually desire remains our only reliable guide to what is desirable [13], in practice a 
matter of ensuring that individuals’ key desires are satisfied as far as possible. The 
normativity of recovery based on this approach is exhausted by the combination of utility 
maximisation, and by issues of rationing of scarce resources or balancing conflicting desires. 
(There may have to be some further normative standards operative in any plausible version of 
this idea concerning, eg., the coherence of one’s desires and the continence of one’s 
judgements. Nevertheless, such constraints remain internal and individualistic.) 
On a eudaimonic view, wellbeing consists in living the kind of live that exemplifies the finest 
distinctively human capacities - the characteristic virtues of human beings. In Aristotle’s 
phrase, it is ‘activity in accordance with virtue’. It thus builds in the idea that some values are 
more valuable than others – beyond matters of individual coherence – and not merely more 
(that is, statistically) desired. The approach retains a key role to individual choice (since it 
recognizes the capacity for sound deliberation as among the most important human 
capacities), and for pleasure (since pleasure will typically accompany the exercise of those 
capacities) . But individuals’ desires and their satisfaction are no longer regarded as the 
measure of wellbeing. By keeping the key connection between eudaimonia and wellbeing in 
focus, an approach to recovery based on this conception of wellbeing could better restrict the 
kind of values that characterise its aim. There remains a gap between wellbeing and mental 
health but a eudaimonic approach looks to be a more promising first move. 
Thus, in addition to the normative standards implicit in the hedonic view, a eudaimonic view 
introduces two further degrees for normative assessment. First, the values that characterise the 
endpoint of recovery are not just any (coherent) desires and choices but values connected to 
human flourishing. This looks to be a more promising route to maintain the pre-theoretic 
notion that recovery is connected to health, whatever the precise relation between mental 
health and wellbeing might be. Second, values can be better or worse and can be subject to 
rational criticism and scrutiny. Thus, for example, if human flourishing really does depend on 
social inclusion then that fact places principled limits on the value of individual autonomy 
and thus principled limits on the nature of recovery. Not just any preferred endpoint 
constitutes the proper aim of recovery, so construed. 
Having sketched the conceptual space for a normatively charged conception of recovery 
based on a eudaimonic view, we will finish with three clarificatory comments. 
First, Aristotle himself held substantial views about the nature of human flourishing. For 
example, he regarded ‘magnificence’ (‘megaloprepeia’) as an important virtue. While we 
might well question many of the ingredients of Aristotle’s view, a broadly eudaimonic view 
of recovery need not be tied to any such substantive view of flourishing. What flourishing is 
would need to be investigated and subjected to ongoing critical scrutiny. 
Second, especially in the light of the flight from medical paternalism to patient or service user 
autonomy, the idea that some values are more valuable than others might smack of 
authoritarianism and thus serve to rule out such an approach from the start. But it need not. 
Just as the empirical world serves a normative standard for what empirical beliefs we should 
hold without that fact implying that science has to be authoritarian, so a conception of real 
and objective values need not lead to authoritarianism either. Rather, it imposes a standing 
obligation for critical reflection on the values we do hold. 
Third, the eudaimonic view of recovery does not preclude a role for hedonic values in mental 
health care. Sincerely held, harmless hedonic values may indeed play a role in a broader 
values based practice. The desires and choices of service users, who indirectly pay for the 
services, should indeed be taken into account in commissioning, for example. And thus 
models for managing competition for limited resources and other values-based conflicts will 
be needed. But it is surely a point in the favour of the eudaimonic view that such values 
would not determine what we ordinarily understand by ‘recovery’ and its direct connection to 
health.  
Conclusions 
We have sketched a recovery model for mental health distinct from a bio-medical model 
according to which recovery is a characterised in non-normative and value-free terms. On the 
alternative view sketched above, the goal of recovery has to be determined through the 
conception of a life to be valued and hoped for by the subject concerned. Such a conception is 
normative or value-laden in so far as it fits, or is appropriate to, or correct for, the individual’s 
self-identity. By connecting recovery to a value-laden conception of health we have 
articulated the conceptual space for a recovery model which stands in genuine contrast to a 
bio-medical model. 
There is a danger, however, that such a view would sever the connection between recovery 
and health and undermine the often connected goal of social inclusion. For those reasons we 
have suggested if a recovery model is adopted based on a connection to a ‘values-in’ model of 
health, the values in play are more promisingly thought of as eudaimonic than hedomic. 
It is, of course, one thing to sketch the conceptual space for a recovery model of mental 
health. It is another to argue convincingly for it.  
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